

# Risk-based Pricing, or Price-based Risk?

Credit Scoring and Credit Control Conference XV

Xin Xu

Unisys Advanced Data Analytics

[xin.xu@unisys.com](mailto:xin.xu@unisys.com)

# Paper In A Nutshell

In a lending relationship

- Creditor: price the debt based on predictions of default risk of Borrower → **risk-based pricing**
- Borrower: the pricing impacts the incentive whether to continue payment (non-default) or not (default) → **price-driven risk**
- Creditor's pricing and default prediction will only be accurate, or “self-fulfilling”, if they are compatible with Borrower's incentive

To illustrate this idea,

- Nash Equilibrium is established
- Existence of equilibria and market failure (where no reasonable default predictions and pricing are possible) are discussed
- Results: proposal for simultaneous estimation; testable hypotheses

Looking for opportunities of collaboration on subsequent empirical studies – please contact me ([xinxu75@gmail.com](mailto:xinxu75@gmail.com)) if you are interested!

# Setup (1/2): Asset

- Similar to setup of Duffie and Lando (2001), a variation of Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996) models
- Fixed probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$
- Risk-neutral world, with discount rate  $r$
- Asset: ex-dividend value  $V_t$  evolves as GBM, with initial value  $V_0$  and dividend yield  $\delta > 0$

$$\frac{dV_t}{V_t} = \mu dt + \sigma dZ_t$$

- Tax shields are offered for interest expense, at a tax rate  $\theta \in (0,1)$  - Asset owner funds asset by issuing debt to take advantage tax shields
- Asset owner becomes Borrower, and issues a console bond
  - This assumption is not central, term loan may be modelled (see Leland and Toft [1996]) without changing the essence

# Setup (2/2): Debt

- Debt amount is  $D$ , with constant interest rate  $c$ , paid continuously
- Default mechanism: Borrower will default and file bankruptcy when asset value  $V_t$  first touches a lower bound,  $V_B \rightarrow$  “default boundary”
  - Similar to Black and Cox (1976) model
  - The (term structure) of PD is the first passage probability from  $V_0$  to  $V_B$
- After default: Creditor will get a fraction  $\gamma$  of the present value (PV) of future cash flows; Borrower will get nothing
  - PV of cash flows:  $\frac{\delta V_B}{r-\mu}$
  - Loss of  $(1 - \gamma)$  is due to the cost of market frictions, understood as “haircuts” in LGD calculation.  $\gamma$  may be interpreted as recoverability of asset

Creditor determines pricing  $c$ ; Borrower determines default boundary/risk  $V_B$

All other parameters are assumed to be exogenous and publicly known

- Exogeneity of  $D$  is a simplistic assumption, and will be discussed later

# Problem for Creditor

- Let  $\tau$  denote the first passage time from  $V_0$  to  $V_B$  (i.e., the random default time) and let  $F(\tau \leq y)$  and  $f(\tau)$  denote CDF and PDF of  $\tau$ , respectively
- Creditor is to find  $c$  given Borrower's default risk and the following condition: *If debt were to be sold immediately after origination, there would be no gain, no loss*

$$D = \underbrace{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-ry} cD [1 - F(\tau \leq y)] dy}_{\text{PV of cash flows if non-default}} + \underbrace{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-r\tau} \gamma \frac{\delta V_B}{r - \mu} f(\tau) d\tau}_{\text{PV of cash flows if default}}$$

↓

Creditor's investment

Market value of the debt

# Solution for Creditor

- $F(\tau \leq y)$  and  $f(\tau)$  are well known in this setup (see Harrison [1990]), and the above equation becomes

$$D = \frac{cD}{r} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{V_0}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha} \right] + \gamma \frac{\delta V_B}{r - \mu} \left( \frac{V_0}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha},$$

where  $\alpha = \frac{\left(\mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right) + \sqrt{\left(\mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)^2 + 2r\sigma^2}}{\sigma^2}$ .

- Re-arranging it, one obtains the solution for Creditor

$$c^*(V_B) = \frac{D - \gamma \frac{\delta V_B}{r - \mu} \left( \frac{V_0}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha}}{\frac{D}{r} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{V_0}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha} \right]}.$$

# Problem for Borrower

- Optimal default policy framework from Leland & Toft (1996), a classic optimal control problem
- Borrower is to find  $V_B$  given Creditor's pricing and the following optimization problem:

$$\text{Max}_{V_B} \quad Q_0 + D$$

$$s. t. \quad Q_t \geq 0 \text{ (limited liability)}, V_B > 0, \forall t,$$

where  $Q_t = E\left[\int_t^\tau e^{-r(s-t)} (\delta V_s - (1 - \theta)cD) ds | \mathcal{F}_t\right]$  is the equity value at time  $t$ , i.e. the expected PV of after-tax net cash flows prior to default

- Note that Borrower maximize the firm value (equity + debt), so there is no conflict of interest between Creditor and Borrower in our model
- $D$  was provided earlier,  $Q_0$  is given next. It turns out that  $(Q_0 + D)$  is monotonically decreasing in  $V_B$ , thus the optimal  $V_B^*$  is obtained from the binding constraints

# Solution for Borrower

- Conjecture the value function  $J(V_t, t) = \text{Max}_{V_B} Q_t$ , which satisfies Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation

$$0 = \text{Max}_{V_B} \left[ \frac{\partial J}{\partial t} + \mathcal{L}J - rJ + (\delta V_t - (1 - \theta)cD) \right], V_t > V_B,$$

where  $\mathcal{L}J$  is the differential generator of  $J$ ,  $\mathcal{L}J = \mu V_t \frac{\partial J}{\partial V_t} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} V_t^2 \frac{\partial^2 J}{\partial V_t^2}$ .

- Assumption of time-homogeneity (i.e.,  $J$  is not a function of time  $t$ ): PDE becomes ODE
- Boundary condition:  $J(V_B^*) = 0, V_t \leq V_B^*$
- “Smooth-pasting” condition:  $\frac{dJ}{dV_t} |_{V_t=V_B^*} = 0$
- Verification Theorem (Duffie and Lando [2001])

Solution is

$$J(V_t) = \begin{cases} \frac{\delta V_t}{r - \mu} - \frac{\delta V_B}{r - \mu} \left( \frac{V_t}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha} - (1 - \theta) \frac{cD}{r} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{V_t}{V_B} \right)^{-\alpha} \right], & V_t > V_B; \\ 0, & V_t \leq V_B \end{cases}$$

$$Q_0 = J(V_0);$$

Note that  $(Q_0 + D)$  is decreasing in  $V_B$ . The constraint-binding  $V_B$  that maximizes equity is obtained using the smooth-pasting condition,

$$V_B^*(c) = \frac{(1 - \theta)\alpha (r - \mu) cD}{(1 + \alpha) \delta r} > 0$$

# Nash Equilibrium



- Creditor:

$$c^*(V_B) = \frac{D - \gamma \frac{\delta V_B}{r - \mu} \left(\frac{V_0}{V_B}\right)^{-\alpha}}{\frac{D}{r} \left[1 - \left(\frac{V_0}{V_B}\right)^{-\alpha}\right]},$$

- Borrower:

$$V_B^*(c) = \frac{(1-\theta)\alpha}{(1+\alpha)} \frac{(r-\mu)}{\delta} \frac{cD}{r} > 0.$$

- In equilibrium,  $c^*$  and  $V_B^*$  are simultaneously determined




# Equilibria


Solutions may not be unique, or even not exist

- Without Loss of Generality, assuming initial asset book value  $V_0 = 1$
- Example: changing ex-dividend expected return of asset,  $\mu$ , and fixing all other parameters at moderate values


$\mu = 1.5\%$   
No Equilibria



$\mu = 3\%$   
Two Equilibria



$\mu = 4.5\%$   
One Equilibria



“Stable” equilibria, behaving intuitively and with reasonable “credit spread” ( $c^* - r$ )

“Unstable” equilibria, behaving weirdly


# Non-existence of Equilibrium, Market Failure

- If equilibrium exist, Creditor will accurately predict Borrower's default risk, and Borrower has the incentive to honor this prediction. There will be no “surprise”
- If equilibrium do not exist, debt should not be issued. Otherwise, no matter how Creditor predicts the default risk, the prediction will under-estimate the actual risk determined by Borrower, incurring a loss

	$\mu = 3\%$ (equilibrium exists)	$\mu = 1.5\%$ (no equilibrium)
Debt amount	0.95	0.95
Creditor's prediction of Borrower's default barrier $V_B$	0.4968	0.55
Creditor's pricing based on default risk prediction	6.196% (discount rate $r=5\%$ )	7.7537% ( $r=5\%$ )
Given pricing, Borrower's optimal $V_B^*(c)$	0.4968	0.99486
The market value of the debt based on $V_B^*$	0.95	0.406 (loss=0.95-0.406)

# Comparative Statics within Feasible Regions

Exogenous Variables	$c^*$	$V_B^*$	Leverag $e\left(\frac{D}{Q_0+D}\right)$
Asset recoverability $\gamma$	↓	↓	↓
Discount rate $r$	↑	↑	↑
Asset expected ex-dividend return $\mu$	↓	↓	↓
Asset volatility $\sigma$	↑	↓ ↑	↑
Debt amount $D$	↑	↑	↑



# Empirical Implications

Simultaneous Equation Modelling (SEM) approach for estimating default risk and pricing consistently and robustly

- Credit spreads or EIR as an endogenous variable to predict default risk
- GMM, IV (2SLS) or other SEM estimation are required, in which typically instrument variable(s) need to be identified
- Reduced-form default risk and pricing models may be adopted, instead of structural models (in this presentation)

Relaxing some assumptions in empirical studies

- Borrower's liquidity may be considered as an exogenous variable – default may be caused by either optimal default barrier or liquidity constraint
- Debt amount  $D$  may be another endogenous variable, determined by other parameters
  - One needs to model mechanism of debt amount determination
  - There may be three simultaneous equations in this system

# Empirically Testable Hypotheses

Tests during “crisis” periods and “normal” periods

- “Crisis” periods: Why does non-existence of equilibrium occur? Could debts still be issued under these circumstances in reality?
  - Asset-related parameters
    - Recoverability is too low (e.g. unsecured debts, or lower seniority)
    - Expected return is too low
    - Volatility is too high
  - Information asymmetry or incomplete information (about above asset-related parameters)
  - Discount rate, or market expected return, is too high (or trivially too low)
  - Debt over-burden
- “Normal” periods: If equilibrium exist, comparative statics may be tested

Please contact me if you are interested in the empirical proposal. I am open to ideas of collaboration in terms of research, funding, data...

# Acknowledgement

I Thank Rodrigo Fontecilla and Unisys Analytics for support and generous sponsorship for this presentation.

I also thank discussant and attendees of Credit Scoring and Credit Control Conference XV for their helpful comments

Unisys Analytics offers Advanced Data Analytics using Big Data Ecosystem (Hadoop, Spark, ...)

- Machine Learning as a Service
- Advanced Analytics Consulting
- Data Scientist on Demand
- Artificial Intelligence applications
- Expertise in Credit Modelling and Financial Risk/Compliance Modelling
- Global expertise in Financial Services industry
- Visit [www.unisys.com/offerings/advanced-data-analytics](http://www.unisys.com/offerings/advanced-data-analytics)